This paper explains the extreme economic zone from the point of view of international transportation. navigation guidelines and overflight measures are also explained. The issues involved have become particularly contentious in the Asia-Pacific region where there has been a series of incidents and disputes that might have spiralled out of control into open conflict.
Introduction
The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) regime was a major development in the international law of the sea, emerging from the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) that culminated in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 1 Military activities in the EEZ were a controversial issue at UNCLOS III and continue to be so in state practice. Some coastal states claim that other states cannot carry out military activities in or over their EEZs without their consent, and have sought to apply restrictions on navigation and overflight in their EEZs that are not accepted by other states.
The issues involved have become particularly contentious in the Asia-Pacific region where there has been a series of incidents and disputes that might have spiralled out of control into open conflict. With the aims of clarifying the rights and duties of both coastal states and user states in an EEZ, and of providing an important regional maritime confidence and security building measure (MCSBM), a group of senior officials, legal experts and maritime specialists (now known as the EEZ Group 21) has been meeting in the region to address relevant issues. 2 The meetings were sponsored primarily by the Ship and Ocean Foundation of Japan (now the Ocean Policy Research Foundation) 3 with the objective of producing a set of non-binding, voluntary principles ('Guidelines'), which would provide the basis for a common understanding and approach to issues arising from the implementation of the EEZ regime.
The last meeting of the EEZ Group 21 held in Tokyo 15-16 September 2005 reached agreement on 'Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone'. The proposed Guidelines are non-binding in nature. They set out broad principles of common understanding regarding certain aspects of navigation and overflight in the EEZ, including military and intelligence gathering activities, but do not create legally binding obligations between states. In keeping with their non-binding nature, the Guidelines are framed in exhortatory rather than obligatory language. They may be generally regarded as reflecting the need for better understanding of the rights and obligations of states conducting activities in the EEZ of another country. They represent a consensus among the Group 21 members on issues that are at present contentious and a potential source of tension and dispute in the region. The introduction to the Guidelines, the Guidelines themselves, and a list of members of EEZ Group 21 are attached as Annexes A, B and C respectively to this paper.
Background
Negotiation of the EEZ regime at UNCLOS III was difficult and complex with widely divergent points of view about the status of the new zone. One major group, the 'territorialists', mainly comprising developing countries, saw the EEZ as an extension of national jurisdiction in which the coastal states would enjoy sovereignty subject to certain limitations. However, this position was sharply disputed by the maritime powers, led by the United States and the then Soviet Union, who saw the zone as a part of the high seas where coastal states had some rights over offshore resources. The compromise reached was that the EEZ should be regarded as a separate zone in its own right ('sui generis'), which was neither high seas nor territorial sea. Now some twenty-five years later, this political 'tug of war' has not gone away. The United States has steadfastly maintained a liberal interpretation of the rights and freedoms other states enjoy in the EEZ of a coastal state, and has coined the expression 'international waters' to describe collectively the high seas, the EEZ and the contiguous zone. 5 On the other hand, some coastal states have sought to strengthen the extent of their jurisdiction over their EEZ by for example, claiming that other states should only conduct military activities in that zone with their consent.
In particular, different opinions exist as to whether coastal state jurisdiction extends to hydrographic surveying and the collection of other marine environmental data that is not resource-related or is not done for scientific purposes. 6 While the UNCLOS has established a clear regime for marine scientific research, there is no specific provision in the Convention for hydrographic surveying. Some coastal states require consent with respect to hydrographic surveys conducted in their EEZ by other states while it is the opinion of other states that hydrographic surveys can be conducted freely in the EEZ.
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The United States regards military surveying as similar to hydrographic surveying and thus part of the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and other international lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms, and conducted with due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal state. 8 The position of the United States is that while coastal state consent must be obtained in order to conduct marine scientific research in its EEZ, the coastal state cannot regulate hydrographic surveys or military surveys conducted beyond its territorial sea, nor can it require notification of such activities. 9 Similarly, the United Kingdom regards Military Data Gathering (MDG) as a fundamental high seas freedom available in the EEZ. 10 However, other states, including China, have specifically claimed that hydrographic surveys might only be conducted in their EEZs with their consent.
11 In December 2002, China announced that it had enacted a new law explicitly requiring Chinese approval of all survey and mapping activities in China's EEZ and stating that unapproved oceansurvey activity will be subject to fines and confiscation of equipment and data.
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These issues are proving particularly problematic in the Asia-Pacific region. Large areas of this region are enclosed as EEZs by one country or another and many regional countries have large EEZs in which they tend to jealously protect their rights, particularly at a time when countries are paying much greater attention to the resource potential of their offshore areas. Furthermore, there are many conflicting and overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction in the region and relatively few maritime boundaries have been agreed. Meanwhile, naval capabilities in the region are improving rapidly and increased attention is being given to intelligence collection and marine environmental research to support naval operations. To some extent, the EEZ regime has been a cause of maritime militarisation in the region with the protection of large maritime zones and marine resources, along with the existence of conflicting claims to offshore areas, often being used as justification for acquiring new maritime capabilities, including missile-armed patrol vessels and maritime strike aircraft.
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that incidents have already occurred involving disputes between coastal states and other states over their respective rights and duties in the EEZ. Research vessels claiming to be conducting military surveys have been warned out of the EEZs of some coastal states, a Chinese fighter aircraft crashed after colliding with a US intelligence collection aircraft in China's EEZ off Hainan in April 2001, and alleged 'spy ships' have been pursued out of Japan's EEZ with one vessel even being sunk after hot pursuit into China's EEZ. Coastal state legislation and offshore activities are beginning to conflict with increasing naval activities of non-coastal states in the region, including exercises, intelligence gathering and research, and their accompanying technological developments.
The explanation of these disputes can be traced back to ambiguity in the EEZ regime, as established by UNCLOS, and a range of perspectives in Asia with regard to interpreting and implementing the regime. Agreement on the EEZ concept at UNCLOS III included many compromises between coastal states and maritime powers resulting in intentional ambiguity in some of its provisions. It was formulated more than 25 years ago in very different political and technological circumstances than those that exist at present. Tensions and misunderstandings may increase unless some greater clarity and awareness of the EEZ regime is provided and agreed.
Balance of Rights and Duties
The basic problem with the EEZ regime lies in the need to find an appropriate balance between the rights and duties of the coastal state and those of other states. 13 In the EEZ, coastal states have sovereign rights over natural resources, both living and non-living, and other economic activities, such as the production of energy from water currents and winds.
14 They also have jurisdiction with regard to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; marine scientific research; and the protection and preservation of the marine environment (including the conservation of species), as well as other rights and duties, as provided for in relevant provisions of UNCLOS. 15 However, the sovereign rights to marine resources gained under the EEZ regime are not without their costs in terms of obligations of the coastal state for preserving and protecting the marine environment and conserving species in the EEZ, and for having due regard to the rights and duties of other states in its EEZ. 16 All other states have freedom of navigation and overflight in the EEZ, as well as the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms. 17 However, in exercising these freedoms, other states are required to have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal state. 18 It has proven very difficult to define an operational test to distinguish between an action that has due regard to the rights and duties of the other party, and one that does not.
A view from the United States is that the EEZ regime does not permit the coastal state to limit traditional non-resources related high seas activities in this EEZ, such as task force manoeuvring, flight operations, military exercises, telecommunications and space activities, intelligence and surveillance activities, marine data collection, and weapons' testing and firing. 19 Those words were written about ten years ago and would most likely now be qualified at least by recognition of the need for such activities to be conducted with due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal state. For example, scheduling an exercise in an area of intensive fishing activity declared by the coastal state, or in a marine park or marine protected area declared by the coastal state as required by Article 194(5) of UNCLOS, 20 could be considered not to have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal state.
Military Activities
The basic problem with military activities in the EEZ is that it is not unambiguously clear from UNCLOS whether military activities are included in the freedoms of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the sea available under UNCLOS Articles 58 and 87. 21 The United States insists on the freedom of military activities in the EEZ out of concern that its naval and air access and mobility could be severely restricted by any global trend towards 'thickening jurisdiction' over the EEZ. The ability to conduct military activities in the EEZ, including military surveying and intelligence collection, is justified on the basis that they are part of the normal high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight that are available in an EEZ under UNCLOS. However, some coastal states, including Bangladesh, Malaysia, India and Pakistan, contend that other states cannot carry out military exercises or manoeuvres in or over their EEZ without their consent. The concern of these states is that uninvited military activities could threaten their national security or undermine their resource sovereignty.
Military Surveys
Military surveys are activities undertaken in the ocean and coastal waters involving marine data collection (whether or not classified) for military purposes. 22 Such data is important, even essential, for effective submarine operations, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), mine warfare and mine countermeasures (MCM), particularly in waters such as the South and East China Seas where oceanographic and underwater acoustic conditions vary widely with uneven bottom topography, fast tidal streams and a relatively high level of marine life. Roach and Smith have observed that:
Military surveys can include oceanographic, marine geological, geophysical, chemical, biological and acoustic data. Equipment used can include fathometers, swath bottom mappers, side scan sonars, bottom grab and coring systems, current meters and profilers. While the means of data collection used in military surveys may sometimes be the same as that used in marine scientific research, information from such activities, regardless of security classification, is intended not for use by the general scientific community, but by the military.
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Military surveying is an expression largely coined by the United States, but the United Kingdom talks about MDG in similar vein. 24 These terms are not specifically addressed by UNCLOS and there is no language stating or implying that coastal states may regulate their conduct in any manner outside their territorial sea or archipelagic waters. 25 Thus the United States 'reserves the right to engage in military surveys outside foreign territorial seas and archipelagic waters', and that to 'provide prior notice or request permission would create an adverse precedent for restrictions on mobility and flexibility of military survey operation'.
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Similarly the United Kingdom believes that states have a right to engage in MDG anywhere outside foreign territorial seas and archipelagic waters without prior notice to, or permission from the coastal state.
Some military intelligence collection activities conducted in the EEZ might also be considered as coming within the scope of 'scientific research', and thus within the scope of the marine scientific research regime in UNCLOS. 27 However, the United States and other maritime powers are strongly of the view that while these activities are within the scope of research, they are associated with the freedoms of navigation and overflight in the EEZ and not under the jurisdiction of the coastal State. Intelligence collection data is only used for military purposes and is not released for public purposes. Again the boundaries between 'military surveys' and 'intelligence collection' may be difficult to determine, and one vessel may concurrently undertake both activities although the external appearance of the vessel (e.g. the aerials on a signals or electronic intelligence vessel), the equipment it is operating (e.g. the type of sonar), and its movements (e.g. whether it is manoeuvring, stopping or continually underway) should give a good lead on the nature of its data collection.
Based on current and planned asset acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific region, military surveying and intelligence gathering activities in EEZs are going to become more controversial and more dangerous. In Asia, the disturbing prospects reflect the increasing (and changing) demands for technical intelligence; the robust weapons acquisition programs, and especially the increasing electronic warfare (EW) capabilities; and the widespread moves to develop Information Warfare (IW) capabilities. Regional countries are expanding or developing submarine forces and face a need to expand their oceanographic knowledge. The scale and scope of intelligence collection activities are likely to expand rapidly over the next decade, involving levels and sorts of activities quite unprecedented in the past. They will not only become more intensive; they will generally be more intrusive. These factors all point to the importance of confidence-building measures such as the proposed Guidelines.
Development of the Guidelines

Process
The EEZ Group 21 meetings were designed to delineate the issues and the areas of agreement and disagreement, and to identify and discuss possible voluntary guidelines for such activities which could reduce conflict potential. Topics covered included recent incidents, operational modalities of various navies and their rules of engagement, the meaning of key terms, initiatives to enhance maritime security, intelligence collection operations and EEZs, means and manner of implementation and enforcement of any agreed rules, options for resolving disagreements, and the way forward.
The title of the meetings 'The Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone: Issues and Responses' implies that they looked at the EEZ regime in an all-embracing fashion but this was not the case. The meetings focused mainly on the rights and duties of states with regard to the conduct of military activities, surveys and intelligence collection in the EEZs. They paid little attention to the host of other issues associated with implementing the regime, such as the conservation and utilisation of living resources and the rights of land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states. The main articles of UNCLOS addressed at the meetings were Articles 56, 58 and to a somewhat lesser extent, 59. However, they did not consider the full extent of the rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal state in its EEZ (Article 56) or indeed, all the rights and duties of other States in the EEZ of a foreign state (Article 58). Most attention with the latter was on activities related to the freedoms of navigation and overflight, and operations by foreign ships and aircraft in an EEZ.
Areas of Agreement
There was agreement that the EEZ is a zone sui generis, and in this regard, the term 'international waters' used by the United States was thought to be misleading. The EEZ Group 21 agreed on the fundamental principle that subject to certain qualifications noted in the Guidelines, military vessels and aircraft have the right to navigate in, or fly over the EEZs of other states, and to engage in other internationally lawful uses of the sea associated with the operations of ships and aircraft (Guideline Va). However, in interpreting this and other principles, participants agreed on the importance of 'due regard', and that this consideration applies to both the coastal state and to a user state. There was recognition that the interpretation of international law is not static, and that the understanding of the rights and duties of states in the EEZ continues to evolve.
The EEZ Group 21 agreed that the exercise of the freedom of navigation and overflight in and above EEZs should not interfere with, or undermine the rights or ability of coastal states to protect and manage their own resources and environment. For example, Guideline IId recognises that the coastal state may, on a temporary basis, place qualifications on the freedom of navigation in areas where special circumstances exist in its EEZ, such as major fishing grounds and marine protected areas, and that these arrangements may be made permanent by reference to the competent international organization. Similarly, Guideline Vg lists areas in the EEZ where military activities should not be conducted by another state.
Guideline IVb recognises that maritime surveillance may be conducted by states for peaceful purposes in areas claimed by other states as EEZ. On military activities generally, Guideline Vb recognises the principle that ships and aircraft of a state undertaking military activities in the EEZ of another state have the obligations to use the ocean for peaceful purposes only, and to refrain from the threat or use of force, or provocative acts, such as stimulating or exciting the defensive systems of the coastal state; collecting information to support the use of force against the coastal state; or establishing a 'sea base' within another state's EEZ without its consent. The avoidance of interference between the electronic systems of the coastal state and ships and aircraft exercising their freedoms of navigation and overflight is covered by Guideline VI.
In reaching consensus that hydrographic surveying in an EEZ should not be conducted without the consent of the coastal state (Guideline IXa), the EEZ Group 21 appreciated the many changes since UNCLOS III with the practice and technology of hydrographic surveying and the utility of hydrographic data. 28 Apart from navigational safety, important applications of hydrographic knowledge include planning the exploration and exploitation of marine resources, the determination of seaward limits of national jurisdiction, coastal zone management, national development (including building new ports and harbours), and the delimitation of maritime boundaries. 29 Coastal state consent for hydrographic surveying should normally be granted unless the surveys fall within one of the consent categories in UNCLOS Article 246(5) (Guideline IXb).
There was agreement that the exercise of the freedoms of navigation and overflight in the EEZ should not be for the purpose of marine scientific research without coastal state consent, subject only to the principle of 'implied consent' set out in UNCLOS Article 252. However, coastal state consent for hydrographic surveying should normally be granted unless the surveys fall within one of the consent categories in UNCLOS Article 246(5) (Guideline IXb).
Areas of Disagreement
Areas of disagreement during the meetings generally related to the meaning of terms in the Convention as well as to the meaning of specific articles. For example, there are specific differences with regard to the meaning of 'freedom' of navigation and overflight in and above the EEZ, i.e. whether this freedom can be limited by certain regulations by the coastal state, or whether such freedoms are absolute.
There are different interpretations regarding the precise meaning of the Convention's phrase allowing 'other internationally lawful uses' of the sea in the EEZ, 30 and the nature of the military activities that this phrase might include. The interpretation of this phrase can in turn be affected by the interpretation of such terms as 'due regard', 'abuse of rights', 'peaceful purposes', 31 and the obligation not to threaten or use force against other states. In this context, questions arise as to whether some military and intelligence gathering activities are a lawful exercise of the freedom of navigation and overflight, whether they are an abuse of rights, whether they pay 'due regard' to the interests of the coastal state, and whether they are a threat to the peace and security of the coastal state.
There is a considerable range of opinion regarding the meaning of 'due regard'. Some countries, e.g. the United States, interpret 'due regard' as requiring any user state to refrain from activities that unreasonably interfere with the exercise of the rights of the coastal state. However, others like China, for example, appear to interpret 'due regard' as requiring foreign users of the EEZ to refrain from activities which endanger the sovereignty, security and national interest of the coastal state. An interpretation applicable to many cases would be whether the activity interferes with the rights and interests of the other state. But there is no agreement as to what constitutes such rights and interests, whether the interference must be unreasonable, and whether it must be actual or potential.
There is also disagreement on how to deal with these uncertainties. But leaving the problem unresolved could be dangerous. Incidents are occurring more frequently and even if bilateral arrangements are agreed, their rules may differ depending on the countries and circumstances. The majority of EEZ Group 21 participants shared the concern that national governments may deal with these matters unilaterally in order to protect their security and other interests. If numerous coastal states were to enact unilateral national legislation prohibiting the exercise of military and intelligence gathering activities in and above their EEZ, then the prohibition against conducting such exercises could become part of customary international law through state practice, despite the opposition of some countries, particularly if those countries are not parties to UNCLOS.
Failing the unlikely resolution of these issues by the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, these disputes will be addressed through a chaotic and disorderly process whereby countries assert and defend their positions through state practice, followed by protests by countries that disagree, and eventually by the give and take of diplomatic negotiations. It is in this context of avoiding unilateralism that may lead to conflict and of providing a common basis for bilateral and multilateral agreements that this dialogue and the Guidelines were developed.
Conclusion
Much has changed over the last 25 years and international law is still evolving with regard to the implementation of the EEZ regime. The Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the EEZ produced by the EEZ Group 21 are intended to contribute to more effective implementation of the regime and improved oceans management generally. They recognise the general principle that military activities in the EEZ, including military surveying and intelligence collection, are part of the freedoms of navigation, overflight, and engagement in other internationally lawful uses of the sea associated with the operations of ships and aircraft. However, the Guidelines also recognise that these freedoms are not absolute and must be conducted with 'due regard' to the rights and obligations of the coastal state in its EEZ. The Guidelines are intended to assist in clarifying what might be considered as not having 'due regard' to the rights and duties of the various parties.
Copies of the EEZ Group 21 Guidelines are now to be distributed at a regional and international level. At the regional level, distribution will include APEC, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF), the Council for Security Cooperation in the AsiaPacific (CSCAP), and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). 32 At the international level, they will be sent to the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, the International Maritime Organization, and the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea. Individual These opposing trends will result in a higher frequency and intensity of such incidents.
Other factors contribute to the problem. The scale and scope of maritime and airborne intelligence collection activities is becoming more intensive and intrusive. They Agreement on the EEZ concept included many compromises between coastal states and maritime powers resulting in intentional ambiguity in some of its provisions. It was formulated more than 25 years ago in very different political and technological circumstances than those that exist at present. The ambiguities and lack of clarity should be examined in the light of these changed circumstances and evolving state practice with a view to reaching agreed interpretation.
Importance of These Guidelines
These Guidelines are important for three main reasons. The first is the complexity of the Asian maritime environment with its unique combination of maritime geography, large areas of claimed EEZ, and many conflicting and overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction. Second, recent incidents indicate that there is considerable ambiguity and range of perspective in Asia with regard to the EEZ regime, particularly the rights and duties of the coastal state vis-à-vis those of user states. Third, coastal state legislation and offshore activities are beginning to conflict with increasing naval activities of non-coastal states in the region, including exercises, intelligence gathering and research, and their accompanying technological developments. Tensions and misunderstandings may increase unless greater clarity and awareness of the EEZ regime are provided and agreed.
Purpose of the Guidelines
The Guidelines serve three main purposes:
• First, they assist in clarifying the rights and duties of both coastal states and user states and certain terminology with regard to the activities that might be undertaken in an EEZ by foreign ships and aircraft.
• Second, the Guidelines constitute an important regional confidence-building measure providing general principles for activities that some states currently regard as contentious.
• Third, they will contribute to more effective oceans management in the region through improved understanding and more effective implementation of the EEZ regime.
Legal Status
The proposed Guidelines are non-binding in nature. They set out broad principles of common understanding regarding military and intelligence gathering activities in the EEZ but do not create legally binding obligations between states. In keeping with their non-binding nature, the Guidelines are framed in exhortatory rather than obligatory language.
The Guidelines may be generally regarded as reflecting the need for better understanding of the rights and obligations of states conducting activities in the EEZ of another country. They represent a consensus among the participants on issues that are at present contentious and a potential source of tension and dispute in the region.
ANNEX B Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) PREAMBLE Participants in the Dialogue on 'The Regime of the EEZ: Issues and Responses':
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the United Nations concerning the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of friendly relations between States;
Recognizing that the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the 1982 UNCLOS) establishes a new regime for the seas and oceans which balances fairly the interests of all States;
Affirming the duty of all States to utilize the oceans for peaceful purposes as stipulated in the 1982 UNCLOS Article 301;
Acknowledging the obligation of all States to preserve and protect the marine environment;
Considering that the EEZ is neither high seas nor territorial sea and is subject to a specific legal regime under the 1982 UNCLOS;
Desiring to ensure the safety and security of navigation in the EEZ;
Recognizing the rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the EEZ as provided in Article 56 of the 1982 UNCLOS;
Recognizing the rights and duties of other States in the EEZ as provided in Article 58 of the 1982 UNCLOS;
Recognizing a need for balance between the rights and duties of a coastal State in its EEZ and the rights and duties of other States;
Mindful that the sovereign rights and jurisdiction exercised by a coastal State in its EEZ differ from the sovereignty it exercises in its internal waters, archipelagic waters (if any), and territorial sea;
Recognizing that Article 300 of the 1982 UNCLOS prohibits the abuse of rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized under the Convention;
Acknowledging the importance of resolving disputes by peaceful means; and
Convinced that these Guidelines will promote understanding of the rights and duties of States conducting military and intelligence gathering activities in the EEZ of another State, and thus contribute to peace, good order, and security at sea, particularly in the Asia Pacific region;
Hereby recommend the following non-binding Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the EEZ.
I. DEFINITIONS
a. For the purposes of these Guidelines: 1. 'abuse of rights' means the unnecessary or arbitrary exercise of rights, jurisdiction and freedoms, or interference with the exercise of rights by another State, or the abuse or misuse of powers by a State causing injury to another State; 2. 'exclusive economic zone' means an area referred to as such in relevant Articles of the 1982 UNCLOS; 3. 'hydrographic survey' means a survey having for its principal purpose the determination of data relating to bodies of water. A hydrographic survey may consist of the determination of one or several of the following classes of data: depth of water, configuration and nature of the seabed; directions and force of currents; heights and times of tides and water stages; and location of topographic features and fixed objects for survey and navigation purposes; 4. 'marine environment' is the physical , chemical, geological and biological components, conditions and factors which interact and determine the productivity, state, condition and quality of the marine ecosystem, the waters of the seas and the oceans and the airspace above those waters, as well as the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof; 5. 'marine scientific research' means activities undertaken in the marine environment to enhance scientific knowledge regarding the nature and natural processes of the seas and oceans, the seabed and subsoil; 6. 'military activities' means the operations of military vessels, aircraft and devices, including intelligence gathering, exercises, trials, training, and weapons practices; 7. 'military surveys' refers to activities undertaken in the marine environment involving data collection for military purposes; 8. 'peaceful uses/purposes' in the context of the EEZ means that uses of that zone, or the purposes of activities conducted therein or thereabove, must not threaten or use force; 9. 'surveillance' means the observation by visual or any technical means of activities on, over or under the seas and oceans; and 10. 'threat of force' means a coercive attempt to compel another State to take or not to take certain specific action, or an action that is directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of that State, or against any of its assets or people, or taken in any other manner inconsistent with the UN Charter. 
II. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE COASTAL STATE
